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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we use household-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine
the impact of new saving incentives that were implemented as part of the overhaul of U.S. welfare
policy during the mid-1990s on the saving of households at risk of entering welfare. The Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families program devolved responsibility of program rules to the states, and
many states have responded by relaxing liquid asset and vehicle-equity limits that determine
program eligibility, and by introducing time limits on benefit receipt. According to the recent
theoretical work and statements made by public officials, such policies are predicted to increase total
savings for those households who have a large ex-ante probability of welfare receipt such as female-
headed households with children. We follow a sample of female heads with children from 1994 to
2001 and find that in both absolute terms, and relative to comparison groups of male heads and
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Do Welfare Asset Limits Affect Household Saving? 
Evidence from Welfare Reform 
 
 
"Mr. Chairman, the welfare system in and of itself needs radical perestroika, restructuring; 
radical overhaul. .... Any asset is a violation of the welfare laws.  We tell the American 
people we want you to save.  We want you to be businessmen and women.  We want you to 
go to work.  But the welfare system in this socialist economy takes away the asset, the 
property, and, worst of all, takes away the incentive for getting out of poverty.  It's a national 
disgrace." 
 
--Jack Kemp, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Testimony to the Joint 
Economic Committee Hearing on The War on Poverty, November 19, 1991.  
 
  Saving is a critical part of a household’s quest for self-sufficiency.  If asset markets are 
incomplete, savings may be the only way for a household to get a down payment for a home, 
educate themselves or their children, move to a different neighborhood with better schools, or 
smooth unforeseen contingencies such as medical emergencies or unemployment.  However, it is 
well documented that low-income American households persistently hold little wealth 
(Browning and Lusardi 1996; Carney and Gale 2001; Charles and Hurst 2002; Hurst, et al. 1998; 
Sherraden 1991; Ziliak 2003).  In 1994 over 90% of welfare recipients, over 80% of pre-retired 
households with children who have less than a high school education, and over 70% of pre-
retired households with children who have just a high school education have accumulated less 
than $500 in liquid assets.  Nearly half of low-income families had zero liquid assets in either 
1994 or 2001.
1 
  A long-standing question faced by economists is “Relative to their incomes, why do the 
poor save so little?”  If low-income households are relatively more impatient than high-income 
households or if low-income households are more likely to have time inconsistent preferences, 
the difference in time preferences could explain the differences in accumulated wealth between 
poor and other households, conditional on income (Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1997; Laibson, 
                                                      
1  Authors’ calculation using 1994 and 2001 data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  
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1997, Angeletos et al., 2001).  Alternatively, by providing households with a consumption floor 
during times of temporary unemployment spells or subsidizing medical care when the household 
experiences a health shock, governmental welfare policies could reduce the household’s income 
uncertainty and thus reduce their need to save for precautionary reasons irrespective of discount 
rates (Hubbard, et al., 1995; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; Neumark and Powers, 1998; Ziliak 
2003).  The high replacement rate of income provided by Social Security for low lifetime-
income households can reduce their need to save for lifecycle reasons.  Aside from decreasing 
precautionary or lifecycle motives to save, government welfare policies may have additional 
direct effects on household saving incentives.  In order to receive many forms of government 
assistance, households are required to hold liquid and vehicle assets below the federal or state 
mandated limits.  An influential theoretical analysis by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) 
shows that such means-tested welfare programs can explain the low savings observed in the data 
for households with low lifetime resources.    
  In this paper, we formally test whether welfare asset limits serve as a deterrent to saving 
for poor households as suggested by the theoretical model of Hubbard, et al. (1995) and by 
prominent policy makers such as Secretary Kemp.  We take advantage of fundamental reform to 
the U.S. welfare system in the mid-1990s to answer this question and to shed new light on the 
saving behavior of low-income families. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 radically changed the delivery of cash welfare to 
program participants.  PRWORA transformed Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
from an entitlement program that provided cash benefits to those households who satisfied state 
and federal eligibility standards into a work-based program called Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) that is almost exclusively controlled by the states.   Funding for TANF  
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is provided by a block grant from the federal government that is tied to the states AFDC 
expenditure level in 1992–1995, but states are able to exert great discretion over program rules.    
  In response to PRWORA, many states attempted to reverse the fortunes of the poor and 
to stimulate saving by loosening limits on liquid-asset and vehicle wealth holdings and by 
adopting time limits on benefit receipt, which are likely to affect precautionary motives to save.  
Testing the impact of these policy changes on saving is important both from a program 
evaluation perspective and because they provide additional evidence on the extent to which the 
theoretical predictions of Hubbard, et al. (1995) regarding asset limits are borne out in the data.    
  Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, including information from the  
1994 and 2001 wealth supplements, we provide the first evidence on the extent to which saving 
responded to the state-level changes in asset limits associated with welfare reform.  To identify 
the effects of the programmatic changes on saving we exploit both cross-state differences over 
time in policy choices as well as the fact that certain populations are more at risk of taking up 
welfare and thus more likely to respond to the policy reforms.  Our key at-risk group is female-
headed households with children, while the comparison groups are female heads without 
children and male headed households.  While other components of the cash welfare system 
changed simultaneously, such has work requirements and earnings disregards, most of these 
affect saving only indirectly via the individual’s earnings.  Thus, our empirical model controls 
for both the baseline level and change in labor-market earnings, along with other measured 
demographics likely to affect saving. 
  Across a variety of model specifications we find that the saving of female-headed 
households with children has not responded economically or statistically to the welfare-reform 
induced changes in liquid-asset limits, vehicle limits, or time limits implemented as part of  
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PRWORA.  Focusing on households most likely to respond to welfare asset limits, we estimate 
the upper bound saving response of the 95 percent confidence interval to a $1000 increase in the 
liquid asset limit to be $50, while the average response across numerous specifications ranges 
from -$80 to $10.   We also show that aside from potentially increasing the incidence of owning 
a vehicle, these changes in asset limits did not affect other measures of self sufficiency (i.e., 
owning a checking account, owning a home, or starting a business). We conclude that the low 
saving of the poor – particularly female heads with children – is not caused by welfare asset 
limits.      
II. Background 
  TANF, like AFDC, is a means-tested program in which eligibility is determined by 
passing a sequence of asset tests as well as gross and net-income tests (along with the 
requirement that dependent children under age 18 be present in the household).   After the 
passing of PRWORA in 1996, many states attempted to reverse the fortunes of the poor and to 
stimulate saving by loosening limits on liquid-asset and vehicle wealth holdings and by adopting 
time limits on benefit receipt, which are likely to affect precautionary motives to save.   
Additionally, net-income tests were also changing during this period.  The income tests under 
AFDC were based on a state’s need standard, i.e. gross income was not permitted to exceed 185 
percent of the state’s need standard.  These income tests are no longer a requirement under 
federal TANF rules, and most states have altered their AFDC program rules accordingly (TANF 
Report to Congress 1998).
2 
  In this section, we outline the change in liquid asset limits undertaken by the states as part 
of their implementation of TANF programs.  We focus on the asset limits first given that it has 
                                                      
2   Under AFDC, two-parent families were eligible for benefits only if the children were deprived of support due to incapacitation 
of a parent or because of the un(under)employment of the principal wage earner.  As of federal fiscal year 1998, however, 37 
states treat single and two-parent households identically for eligibility purposes, 8 states retained all three original rules, and the 
remaining states retained some of the restrictions and/or modified the original rules (Gallagher, et al. 1998).  
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received the most attention by policy makers and academics as being a cause of low saving 
among the poor. In Section VI, we discuss and test the impact of many of the other policy 
changes implemented by the states as part of the overhaul of their welfare programs.   
Foreshadowing the results, we find that these additional policy reforms, like asset-limit changes, 
have had little effect on the saving of the poor.   
  Historically, states were given some latitude in setting real property and vehicle asset 
limits used in determining benefit eligibility under AFDC.
3  Indeed, prior to the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, there was substantial state-specific heterogeneity in asset limits, but 
by 1984 only five states had vehicle limits below the allowable federal maximum of $1500, and 
nine states had non-housing, non-burial personal property limits below the federal maximum of 
$1000.  However, by 1994, all states but two had their asset limits set equal to the federal 
maximum (California and Iowa had received welfare waivers prior to 1994).  Under TANF, most 
states have broke ranks with the more restrictive AFDC rules and have altered their asset limits.  
Specifically, by federal fiscal year 2001, 41 states and the District of Columbia had increased the 
liquid-asset limit above their previous 1994 limit of $1000 (Gallagher, et al. 1998; TANF Report 
to Congress 1998, 2002).  For most of these states, the published goal of increasing asset limits 
associated with TANF was to promote saving among low income households.  In Appendix 
Table 1, we summarize the changes in liquid-asset and vehicle-equity limits for the typical 
TANF recipient relative to the previous federal maximum limit.  As of 2001, nine states had kept 
their liquid asset limit at $1,000, 22 states increased their liquid asset limit by between $500 and 
$1,000, and the remaining 20 states increased their liquid asset limit by more than $1,000.  Ohio 
                                                      
3  Many AFDC/TANF recipients also receive Food Stamp benefits.  However, unlike TANF, the Food Stamp Program is 
administered at the national level.  In terms of welfare policy, AFDC/TANF imposes one set of asset limits on its recipients and 
the Food Stamp Program places a potentially different set of asset limits on its recipients.  In a robustness section, we discuss our 
results when we control for the interaction of different welfare policy asset limits on household saving.   
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is the only state to remove the liquid asset requirement.
4 The heterogeneity in changes in the 
liquid asset limits across states will provide identification for our empirical work. 
  Perhaps surprisingly, there has been a paucity of research on the effect of assets limits on 
household saving.  The survey of transfer programs by Danziger, et al. (1981) discusses the 
impact of social security on private saving, but not the effect of welfare programs, while the 
more recent income-transfer survey by Moffitt (1992) is silent altogether on the saving decision.  
Recently, theoretical models on the effects of means tested asset programs on household wealth 
accumulation preceded the empirical work.  Specifically, Hubbard, et al. (1995) investigated the 
implications of asset-based means testing in a life-cycle simulation model of saving with 
earnings uncertainty and out-of-pocket medical expenditures.  Their simulations suggest that 
because of the existence of asset limits on government sponsored welfare programs, coupled 
with the consumption floor of benefits, low-income households are better off by not engaging in 
significant saving.  They concluded that means tested asset limits were an important hindrance to 
the saving of low income households. 
  To our knowledge, Powers (1998) offers the only formal empirical test of asset limits on 
private saving.
5  She studied how changes in the net wealth of 229 female heads of household in 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women responded to the homogenization of cross-
state asset limits after passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.  Her preferred 
estimate is that saving between 1978 and 1983 decreased by $0.25 for each $1 decrease in the 
asset limit in 1981.  In our study, we offer new and improved estimates of the impact of asset 
                                                      
4  To account for the unlimited liquid asset limits, we exclude households from Ohio from our sample.  Our results were not 
sensitive to this restriction.  In fact, we found that at-risk households in Ohio were not more likely to increase liquid asset 
holdings between 1994 and 2001 (compare to households in other states). 
5  Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) also study the impact of Medicaid asset limits on private saving and find evidence consistent with 
Powers (1998). Their analysis is less direct than Powers (1998) because the impact of asset limits is identified off an interaction 
between states with asset limits and changes in Medicaid coverage. In related work, Neumark and Powers (1998) examine the 
effect of cross-state differences in SSI benefits (i.e. the consumption floor) on pre-retirement saving.  
  7  
limits on household saving; new because this is the first study to exploit the most comprehensive 
overhaul in welfare policy and its impact on saving; improved because we use a higher-quality 
survey of wealth, we implement a more precise identification strategy of policy reforms, and we 
examine more targeted outcomes associated with the policy reforms (e.g. liquid asset 
accumulation, propensity to purchase vehicles, and propensity to become a homeowner).   
Specifically, in our analysis, as in Powers, we focus on a group of individuals who are most 
likely to respond to welfare programs—female-headed households with children. Where we 
differ in our identification scheme relative to Powers is in our use of female-headed households 
with no children and male-headed households as comparison groups.
6  As we discuss below, the 
near term incidence of welfare for these two groups in our sample was essentially zero.  Lastly, 
we focus on a different time period – the mid 1990s – where the specific goal associated with 
changing welfare asset limits at the state level was to stimulate savings among low income 
households.  In later sections, we offer some possible explanations for the difference between our 
results and the results of Powers.   
III. Data  Description 
  To examine the effects of recent welfare reform on the saving of low income households, 
we use data that comes from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) for the years 1994 to 2001.  The PSID began in 1968 with 4,802 households and over 
18,000 individuals and by the 1994 wave had nearly 8,500 families and over 50,000 individuals.  
Of the initial 4,802 households, 2,930 were selected from the Survey Research Center’s random 
sample of the U.S. population, while the remaining 1,872 families were drawn from the Survey 
of Economic Opportunity’s sample of the low-income population.  The latter sample feature 
                                                      
6 It should be noted that our results are not driven by the use of a comparison group.  Identification of asset-limit effects on 
saving is obtained from cross-sectional variation in asset policy.  The comparison groups are simply used as an additional 
specification check to verify that our results are not spurious. As we show in Table 2, no matter how we cut the data, female 
heads with children did not respond to the change in asset limits.  
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makes the PSID a valuable tool for the study of U.S. welfare programs.  Starting in 1968, the 
PSID has re-interviewed individuals from those households every year—adults have been 
followed as they have grown older, and children have been observed as they advance through 
childhood and into adulthood.  The main focus of the PSID’s data collection effort is on 
economic and demographic characteristics, especially with respect to earned and unearned 
income (welfare as well as asset income), employment, family composition, and geographic 
location. 
  For the purpose of this study, a key feature of the PSID is the wealth supplements, 
particularly those collected in 1994 and 2001.  Funded by grants through the National Institute 
on Aging, the wealth supplements contain comprehensive data on net worth, defined as the sum 
of liquid assets (checking accounts, savings accounts, CDs, IRAs, bond and stock values), the 
value of business equity, real estate equity, and vehicle equity, less any outstanding debts.  The 
PSID wealth data compares favorably with other, more targeted, wealth surveys such as the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Curtin, et al. 1989; Juster, et al. 1999), with the added 
feature that because low-income households are over-sampled we get a more detailed picture of 
saving among actual and potential welfare recipients.
7 
 Aside  from  the  PSID, which contains all pertinent demographic information, the other 
data needed are information on state-specific welfare policy variables, including asset limits.
8  
The data for these variables come from Gallagher, et al. (1998), Crouse (1999), TANF Report to 
Congress (1998; 2002), and various issues of the Committee on Ways and Means Green Book.  
The program data are readily linked to the PSID data via state identifiers.  All income and wealth 
                                                      
7  A recent study sponsored by the Social Security Administration and conducted by Mathematica Policy Research Institute 
(Czajka et al., 2003) concludes that the PSID and the SCF provide high quality wealth estimates.  They also conclude that data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) dramatically underestimates household wealth holdings. 
8 As we will discuss in Section 6, we also include controls for other state welfare programs including the level and the change in 
vehicle asset limits, whether the state imposes time limits for welfare receipt, and the level and the change in the state’s 
maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a three-person household.    
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data are converted into 1996 dollars using the corresponding seasonally adjusted June CPI-U.  
As a result, all data in the paper – aside from that which is presented in the appendices describing 
the change in welfare limits – are in 1996 dollars.   
  A. Sample  Composition 
  As argued by the National Research Council (2001), evaluations of welfare reform 
should not be restricted simply to the population of current recipients or leavers, but rather to the 
at risk population at large.  This coincides with the model by Hubbard, et al. (1995), whereby the 
populations touched by means-tested asset programs are all households who are "at risk" of 
ending up welfare.  That said, the socio-economic composition of the current welfare population 
should provide some guidance in determining those households deemed to be at high-risk of 
welfare use as opposed to those at moderate or low risk of welfare use. 
  We begin our sample-selection process by examining the socio-economic status of actual 
welfare recipients in 1994.  Using PSID data, the average head of an AFDC family in 1994 was 
34 years old and had just over two children, and 80 percent were single women (the residual 
being two-parent or child-only cases).  Over 80 percent of heads receiving AFDC support in 
1994 had only a high school degree or less, and the median labor-market income for these heads 
was a meager $162.  Very few of these families were ‘banked,’ i.e. they did not own a checking 
or savings account, stocks or bonds, a house, or a business.  Nearly 80 percent had no liquid 
assets, 96 percent had liquid assets below the $1000 minimum and 93 percent had less than one-
half of the minimum.  As we will emphasize below, these latter figures suggest that the liquid 
asset limits are not binding for essentially all households currently on AFDC in 1994.    
  To perform our analysis of whether asset limits are a deterrent to household saving, we 
need to define a group which has a high probability of welfare receipt.   Given the above  
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description of 1994 welfare recipients, we focus on female headed households who have children 
under the age of 18 and who have less than 16 years of school.  Between the years 1994 and 
2001, 48% of this demographic group participated in AFDC or TANF at some time.
9    As a 
group, female headed households with children are at significant risk of welfare take up.  This 
contrasts starkly with other groups in the population.  The probability of welfare take up any 
time between 1994 and 2001 for households in our two comparison groups – male headed 
households and female headed households with no children – is essentially zero (1.9% and 0.0%, 
respectively).
10   Given the near zero probabilities of welfare take up in the short term for 
households in these comparisons groups, asset limits should have little, if any, effect on their 
saving decisions.  However, if asset limits are an important deterrent to savings, female headed 
households with children should respond to their removal.   One further comment on our choice 
of at-risk sample is warranted.  Only 2% of high educated female headed households with 
children (i.e., those with 16 or more years of schooling) participated in AFDC/TANF at any time 
between 1994 and 2001.  Given that there is essentially no probability of these high educated 
female heads to participate in welfare, we restrict our analysis to households where the head has 
less than a college degree.   
  The cross-state variation in asset-limit policies is sufficient to identify the effect of asset 
limit changes on household saving.  However, to net out the possibility of spurious relationships 
between policy changes and economic behavior it is common in the literature to use comparison 
groups such as female headed households with no children and male headed households (both 
single and married).  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) assumed that single, childless women have 
                                                      
9 Below, we discuss the specific PSID sample used to compute the figures in this section.  As with the descriptive statistics in 
Table 1, all probabilities of taking up welfare reported in this section are weighted using 2001 core PSID weights. 
10 The zero probability of AFDC/TANF take up for women without children is not surprising given that a child is necessary for 
eligibility into these programs.  Our women without children sample required that the women didn't have a child in any years 
between 1994 and 2001.  
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similar labor-market trends as single women with children and thus function as a valid 
comparison group to identify the effects of tax and social policy changes in the 1980s and mid-
1990s on the labor-market behavior of single women with children.  We implicitly follow the 
strategy used by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and compare the saving response to welfare 
reform by single women with children to those without children.  However, we also recognize 
that while single female heads without children are not currently eligible for cash welfare, they 
may be eligible in the future if they have children (and have low-incomes and assets).  Hence, 
single women without kids are potentially at moderate risk of future welfare participation and 
thus may alter their saving in the presence of asset tests.   With this in mind, we use male headed 
households as an additional comparison group.  Given the information above, male headed 
households (with or without children) have essentially a zero take up rate of AFDC/TANF 
programs.  Such a fact makes them unlikely to respond to the AFDC/TANF policy changes. 
  Formally, we define our full sample as including all PSID households where the head (i) 
was between the ages of 18 and 44 in 1994, (ii) had less than 16 years of schooling, (iii) 
remained in the sample continuously between 1994 and 2001, (iv) did not change their state of 
residence between 1994 and 2001, (v) did not change marital status between 1994 and 2001, and 
(vi) did not have missing values for wealth in either 1994 or 2001.  Lastly, for female headed 
households, we imposed that there was consistently no children in the household between 1994 
and 2001 (female with no children sample) or that there was consistently a child in the household 
between 1994 and 2001 (female with children sample).   In section 6, we report results where 
some of these restrictions are relaxed.  Before we proceed, however, we will discuss our 
rationale for these restrictions.  
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  First, we restrict our analysis to households under the age of 44 in 1994 and with less 
than 16 years of schooling because these are the households with the most risk of welfare take 
up.  As shown above, the AFDC/TANF take up rate for female heads with children who have 
more than 16 years of schooling was essentially zero.  The remaining restrictions (iii – vi) 
impose that our sample composition is homogenous between 1994 and 2001.  By following the 
same household heads over time we are able to track 7-year changes in the household’s asset 
position and also avoid potential sample composition bias arising from individuals changing 
family status in response to the policy changes.  Such composition changes may plague program 
evaluations using groups of households over time such as found in repeated cross-section data 
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).  Next, holding state of residence fixed allows us to avert potential 
welfare-migration problems, which in this case could occur if welfare recipients move to states 
with more generous treatment of assets.
11   
  In total, our sample is comprised of 1,418 households.  Of that total, 347 households are 
headed by a female.  Of the 347 female headed households, 281 of them have at least one child 
under the age of 18 present continuously between 1994 and 2001.   Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for our full sample, for a sample of households headed by men and by women without 
children, and a sample of female headed households with children.   The median female headed 
household with children in 1994 (with education < 16 years of schooling) has zero liquid assets 
and less than $400 of net worth.   Liquid assets are defined as the sum of cash, checking and 
saving account balances, and stock and bond holdings.  Net worth is the sum of liquid assets, 
                                                      
11  Relaxing this restriction raises the sample size by 8.9%, but only by 4.1% among female heads with children.  We reestimated 
our models without imposing this restriction and our results were unchanged.  Additionally, we found no evidence that welfare 
migration was important.  The cross-state moves by female heads were fairly evenly distributed across high asset states and low 
assets states.  Among the set of movers 63% went to low-asset changing states and 37% to high-asset changing states.  Thus, 
there is not much evidence of welfare-induced migration.   
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business equity, home equity and vehicle equity less any non-collateralized debt.  This finding 
suggests that female headed households, as a group, were saving very little as of 1994. 
 B.  Descriptive  Statistics 
  Panel A of Table 2 shows the wealth holdings in 1994 and 2001 for our sample of female 
headed households with children, broken down by whether they live in a state that had small (or 
zero) liquid asset limit increases between 1994 and 2001 or whether they live in a state that had 
large liquid asset limit increases between 1994 and 2001.  We define states that increased their 
AFDC/TANF liquid asset limit by $1,000 or less as states with low asset limit changes.   States 
that increased their liquid asset limit by more than $1,000 are considered to be high asset limit 
changers.      
  Focusing on Panel A, two things are of note.  First, in 1994, nearly all female headed 
households with children had liquid assets less than their state's AFDC liquid asset limit (87% in 
low asset limit changing and 82% in high asset limit changing states).  In 1994, all but two states 
applied the federal AFDC liquid asset limit of $1,000.    If welfare asset limits were a binding 
deterrent to saving, you would expect to see a large amount of households with savings close to 
the state mandated asset limit.  However, this is not the case.   Households who have liquid 
wealth below the asset limits are always far below the limit.  Specifically, for female heads with 
children in low asset limit changing states, 98% of those with 1994 liquid wealth below the 1994 
asset limit had liquid wealth below $500 (0.85/0.87) and 85% had zero liquid assets (0.74/0.87).  
The comparable numbers for female heads with children in high asset limit changing states were 
94% and 80%, respectively.  The results of Panel A of Table 2 suggest that the original 1994  
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liquid asset limits did not appear to be binding for female heads with children in the sense that 
female heads with children had liquid wealth far below the asset limits.
12   
The low asset holding of female heads is not an artifact of the PSID data.   Similar results 
are found using data on households with less than a college degree both from National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP).
13   In the 1997 NLSY, the share of families with zero liquid assets is 48.9%, the share 
with less than $500 in liquid assets is 66.9%, and the share with less than $1000 in liquid assets 
is 74.6%.
14  In the 1993 SIPP data, 84% of female headed households with children reported 
having less than $1,000 in liquid assets, 78% had less than $500 in liquid assets, and 58% had 
zero liquid assets (author's calculation).  The differences between the SIPP and PSID most likely 
arise from the fact that the liquid asset measure in the SIPP data includes cash held outside the 
banking system.  However, even accounting for cash holdings, female heads with children 
accumulate hardly any liquid assets.
15 
  The second thing of note from panel A of Table 2 is that the change in wealth between 
1994 and 2001 for female heads with children in high asset limit changing states does not look 
different than the change in wealth between 1994 and 2001 for females with children in low asset 
limit changing states.  If the welfare limits were a strong deterrent to wealth accumulation, one 
would predict a bigger increase in wealth accumulation for households who lived in states that 
                                                      
12  Data from selected issues of Quarterly Public Assistance Statistics in the 1980s and early 1990s provide supporting evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that liquid asset limits do not bind for welfare recipients.  The data indicates that only about 4 
percent of new AFDC applicants were denied benefits due to asset-limit violations, while only about 1.5 percent of recipients 
were denied benefits at recertification. 
13   The PSID data also calibrates well with the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  For example, 74.2% of all female heads 
under the age of 65 in the 1989 SCF (regardless of educational attainment or whether children were present in the households) 
report having liquid assets less than $5,000.  See Haveman and Wolff (2001).  The comparable number for a similarly defined 
sample within the 1994 PSID data was 80.8%.   
14  We thank Annamaria Lusardi for providing us with statistics from the NLSY. 
15  Given its panel dimension, the PSID data is much more appropriate for our analysis than the SIPP data, despite the SIPP's 
large sample size.  The SIPP panel runs from 1996 through 2000 and does not span the change in welfare asset limits.   As 
discussed above, we have examined the mean wealth holdings in the SIPP for different cross sectional years and they line up well 
with the PSID for the group of households at risk of welfare participation.  
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relaxed the liquid asset limits the most.   This is just not the case.  Liquid assets, at the median, 
did not change at all between 1994 and 2001 for females with children in either the low or the 
high asset changing states.   Median net worth for female heads with children in high asset limit 
changing states increased less between 1994 and 2001 than the median net worth increase for 
female heads with children in low asset limit changing states during the same time period ($900 
versus $100, respectively; p-value of difference = 0.08).    
  Additionally, if the 1994 welfare asset limit of $1,000 was a binding constraint for 
households, we should see the propensity for households to have liquid assets above $1,000 
increase dramatically between 1994 and 2001 (as the asset limits were relaxed).  However, in 
both low asset limit changing states and high asset limit changing states, there was essentially no 
increase in the propensity for female heads with children to have liquid assets above $1,000 
between 1994 and 2001 (0.06 and 0.08 percentage points, respectively; p-value of difference = 
0.77).   Nor was there an increase in the propensity for them to have liquid assets above $500 
between 1994 and 2001 (0.08 percentage points in both high and low asset limit changing states; 
p-value of difference = 0.90).   Looking down the last two columns of panel A of Table 2, there 
is no evidence that households who lived in high asset limit changing states increased any 
measure of their saving more than households living in low asset limit changing states.  If 
anything, measures of saving actually fell for female heads with children in high asset limit 
changing states relative to the saving in low asset limit states. 
  Three additional comments are needed with respect to Table 2.  First, a potential problem 
with our empirical strategy could occur if households shelter assets from both welfare agencies 
and the PSID.  If asset sheltering is prevalent, large changes in welfare asset limits should reduce 
the incentives to shelter.  As a result, we may observe an increase in measured assets in the data  
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that represents nothing more than a shift from unmeasured (sheltered) savings to measured 
saving.  This, however, seems rather unlikely for most households.  An ethnographic study of 
low-income mothers by Edin and Lein (1997) suggests that some mothers shelter income from 
welfare authorities but they state clearly that none of the women own liquid assets of any note.  
If the results of Edin and Lein are not universal, the fact that some households shelter assets 
could cause us to overstate the effect of changing asset limits on household saving.  Given that 
we are not finding any evidence of increased saving resulting from the change in welfare policies 
that occurred in the mid 1990s, the potential of hidden assets will not affect our conclusions. 
  Additionally, as seen in Panel A of Table 2, female headed households with children that 
lived in states which increased their welfare asset limits the most had higher initial levels of 
saving in 1994.   Specifically, 56% of female heads with children living in high asset limit 
changing states owned a car in 1994 and 28% owned a home in 1994.  The comparable numbers 
for female heads with children living in states with low asset limit changes were 42% and 16%.   
Additionally, 35% of females with children in high asset limit changing states had positive liquid 
assets.  In contrast, only 26% of female heads with children in low asset limit changing states 
had positive liquid asset.    This suggests that the ex-ante saving propensities of female heads 
with children living in high asset limit changing states may have been higher than the saving 
propensities of their counterparts in low asset limit changing states.   If households in high asset 
limit changing states have higher saving propensities, we may find a spurious correlation 
between a change in liquid asset limits at the state level and a change in household saving.   
  Using comparison groups can help us to mitigate the impact of this spurious correlation.  
The sample of male headed households and female heads with no children (Panel B of Table 2) 
display similar saving patterns across the two types of asset limit changing states.   In 1994, male  
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heads and female heads with no children who lived in high asset limit changing states had higher 
net worth, higher vehicle ownership propensities, higher home ownership propensities, and 
larger changes in median net worth between 1994 and 2001.   If households in high asset limit 
changing states have high saving propensities, we would expect to find a positive correlation 
between changing asset limits and the saving of male heads and female heads with no children.  
However, theoretically, these households should not respond at all to changes in asset limits.   It 
should be noted that even if there was a positive spurious correlation between savings behavior 
and the change in asset limits, we will be biased towards concluding that the initial asset limits 
were a deterrent to household saving.  As we show below, our conclusion is quite the opposite. 
  Lastly, Table 2 illustrates that, between 1994 and 2001, there was a general increase in 
asset holdings for all households in all states.  This is not surprising for two reasons.  First, we 
are focusing on stable households over time.  As households progress through their lifecycle, the 
permanent income hypothesis predicts that wealth should increase as households age (up until 
retirement).  This fact alone would cause household wealth to be increasing over time for our 
sample of households.  Additionally, the period between 1994 and 2001 was one marked by 
strong economic growth.  Both corporate equity markets and housing markets earned above 
normal returns during this time.  Furthermore, earned income grew at rapid rates (as 
unemployment rates and duration fell sharply).  Both facts decreased welfare caseloads and 
increased household wealth accumulation.   
  In the empirical work that comes next, we will control for many facets of the economic 
environment in the late 1990s.   Our identification will mainly come from comparing the savings 
behavior of female headed households in high asset changing states with the savings behavior of 
female headed households with children in low asset changing states.  To control for underlying  
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trends in those states, we are going to use both male headed households and female headed 
households with no children as comparison groups.  As noted above, these comparison groups 
have essentially no short term probability of ending up on AFDC/TANF.  Hence, the change in 
welfare policies should be uncorrelated with their saving propensities.  Such empirical work will 
provide multivariable analysis for what was done in Table 2.   However, by itself, the results in 
Table 2 are quite powerful.  Table 2 shows that no matter how you cut the data in a univariate 
sense, increasing AFDC/TANF asset limits had no apparent effect on the propensity to 
accumulate liquid wealth or net worth for female heads with children.  As noted above, these 
results are not limited to the PSID data.  We find similar results when examining cross sections 
from the SIPP and the NLSY.   This should not be too surprising given that, as shown in Table 2, 
the welfare asset limits in 1994 did not seem to serve as a binding constraint for most 
households. 
IV. Empirical  Model  
  Based on the previous discussions, we develop a multivariate empirical model to relate 
welfare policies to asset accumulation. To begin we note that while the theoretical model 
developed within Hubbard, et al. (1995) does not offer a closed-form solution it can, in principle, 
be solved for either the choice variable (consumption) or the state variable (wealth) via the 
lifetime budget constraint. Thus the model admits reduced-form specifications based on either 
wealth levels or wealth flows (saving).  We begin with a levels specification for household i in 
state k at time t: 
    , ikt ikt kt kt ikt AZ L L Pu α ϕλ =++ +              (1)  
where Aikt is a measure of the stock of assets (either liquid assets or net worth), Zikt is a vector of 
demographics that reflect household saving preferences such as income, education, age, race,  
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gender, marital status, and initial assets, and LLkt is the state-level liquid-asset limit in time t.  In 
section 6, we will control for additional welfare policies that may affect household savings.  Pkt 
is a vector of state-specific economic conditions and policies such as state unemployment rates 
and a proxy for the welfare consumption floor in the maximum AFDC/Food Stamp benefit for a 
family of three. 
  We specify the composite error term, uikt, as follows: 
   , ikt kt it ik t k i ikt u ε ω θ ν κ δ υ + + + + + + =        (2) 
where  i υ  reflects time-invariant and person-specific preferences for wealth,  k δ  reflects time-
invariant and state-specific preferences for wealth,  t κ  is an aggregate time effect that impacts all 
households identically in a given period,  ik ν  is a time-invariant and person-state preference 
effect for wealth,  it θ  is an idiosyncratic person and time effect for wealth,  kt ω  is a state and time 
wealth effect, and  ikt ε  is an idiosyncratic person-state-time effect.   It is clear that by restricting 
attention to those households who do not change their state of residence, and then first 
differencing, we can eliminate all forms of unobserved heterogeneity to accumulate wealth that 
is time invariant and state- or person-specific, i.e.  0 = ∆ = ∆ = ∆ ik k i ν δ υ .   
  In first difference form, our empirical model is:  
        , ikt ikt kt kt t it kt ikt SZ L L P α ϕλ κ θ ω ε =∆ + ∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆ +∆    (3) 
where Sikt is the amount of household saving, i.e.  1 − − = ∆ ≡ ikt ikt ikt ikt A A A S .  Because we only have 
two years of wealth data (1994 and 2001), the aggregate time effect, t κ ∆ , is subsumed into the 
constant term.     
  In addition to eliminating time-invariant heterogeneity, first differencing permits us to 
model some of the remaining heterogeneity in a transparent fashion.  Specifically, we model  
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changes in the person and year effect as a linear function of baseline demographics of the 
household, i.e.  it ikt Z θ β ∆= .  This permits demographics to have both a level effect (via Zikt) and 
a growth effect (via ∆Zikt) on assets.  Likewise, we model changes in state-time effects as a linear 
function of the baseline state economic conditions, i.e. ∆ωkt = Pktη, such that the consumption 
floor has both a level and growth e f f e c t  o n  a s s e t s .    B e l o w ,  we discuss fully the variables 
included in our Zikt and Pkt controls. 
  Replacing these terms into equation (3) yields our baseline estimating equation: 
                   . ikt ikt ikt kt kt kt ikt SZ Z L L P P δ βα ϕ η λ ε =+ + ∆ +∆ + + ∆ + ∆            (4) 
Importantly, as discussed in sections II and III, we permit the coefficients on the change in asset 
limits to differ across various family structures.  Specifically, we include the change in the asset 
limit as a control and along with the asset limit change interacted with a dummy variable for 
whether the head was a female who had children (and also include a separate dummy variable for 
female heads with children to capture level differences). 
  Based on the previous discussion, the sign of ϕ should be positive for households at high 
risk of entering welfare.  For example, female headed households with children should respond 
more strongly to the policy changes than either male headed households or female headed 
households without children.   Because saving by members of the comparison group should not 
respond to the change in welfare policy, the coefficient ϕ should be zero.  
  Before going to the results section, a comment is needed on how big an effect we should 
expect the change in asset limits to have on the wealth accumulation of women with children 
between 1994 and 2001.   While savings rates may respond quickly after the implementation of 
the welfare reform policies, the stock of savings may respond much more slowly.   The question 
we wish to address is:  "Given reasonable savings propensities, how much additional asset  
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accumulation should we expect when welfare asset limits are increased in 1996?"   Female 
headed households with children earned, on average, $14,000 of labor income between 1994 and 
2001 (Table 1).   If such households had a 10% savings rate, we would expect them to 
accumulate an additional $7,000 in net worth during the 5 years between 1996 and 2001 
($1,400/year).  We start our hypothetical in 1996, given that is the year the asset limits were 
relaxed for almost all states.   If the households only had a 5% savings rate, we would expect 
their accumulated savings to increase by $3,500 during the five years between 1996 and 2001.   
This implies that if their state's asset limit increased by $1,000 (the median increase for 
households in the sample), their savings should increase by the full $1,000.  Given our sample, 
71% of female headed households live in states where the liquid asset limit increased by less 
than $1,500 and 96% lived in states where the liquid asset limit increased by less than $2,000.   
In other words, ϕ should be close to 1 for the median female headed households with children 
even if they only had a savings rate of 3% per year.




In the ensuing tables we focus attention on the coefficients associated with the state 
change in asset limits between 1994 and 2001 and these state asset limit changes interacted with 
whether the household head was a female with children.  However, we do include additional 
controls for the household head's 1994 age, race, education, and level of liquid assets.  We also 
include controls for the change in household size between 1994 and 2001, the average household 
labor income between 1994 and 2001, average labor income squared, the change in labor income 
                                                      
16   A 3 percent savings rate out of $14,000 of annual income results in $420 of savings per year.  Taken over five years, this 
implies an additional accumulated amount of savings of $2,100 between 1996 and 2001.  
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between 1994 and 2001.  Lastly, we include a vector of state specific controls including the state 
GDP per capita in 1994 and the change in the state unemployment rate between 1994 and 2001.
17 
A.  Changes in Liquid Assets 
 
  Before estimating by how much liquid assets increase in response to changes in liquid 
asset limits, we examine whether the probability of increasing liquid assets differs with respect to 
changes in welfare asset limits.  Panel A of Table 3 has a dependent variable which is equal to 1 
if the household increased their liquid assets between 1994 and 2001.  Panel B of Table 3 shows 
the specification from equation (4) where the dependent variable is the actual change in liquid 
assets between 1994 and 2001.   Column I (in both panels A and B) uses a sample where the top 
and bottom 5% of the change in liquid asset distribution is truncated.  The second column reports 
the results of equation (4) using the full sample.  Given the skewness of the change in liquid 
asset distribution, we use a robust regression estimator for the Panel B estimates.   
  Appendix Table A2 shows the results of the complete regression associated with panel B 
of Table 3 (column I).   The main thing to note about Table A2 is that for our PSID sample, 
liquid assets vary as would be predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.   In this 
specification, household liquid asset accumulation is a convex function of average family 
income.   For households with average earned income above $12,500, household saving between 
1994 and 2001 is strictly increasing in income.   Also, households who had positive income 
growth between 1994 and 2001, who were higher educated, and who were white saved more 
between 1994 and 2001.  All of these coefficients were statistically significant at the 1% level.  
This is consistent with much of the findings in the literature (see Hurst, Luoh and Stafford 1998).  
                                                      
17 In the ensuing tables the standard errors for the linear probability models are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by 
state of residence.  The standard errors are bootstrapped in the robust regression models.  
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Such results provide evidence that the PSID wealth data varies across households as one would 
predict based on economic theory. 
    If AFDC/TANF asset limits were a hindrance to savings for households at risk of 
welfare participation, we would expect to see a large response in liquid asset accumulation to 
their removal.  This is just not the case.  As seen in panel A of Table 3 (column I), female heads 
with children did not increase their liquid asset holdings to any significant extent between 1994 
and 2001 (coefficient = 0.02; standard error = 0.04).    The mean probability of increasing liquid 
assets between 1994 and 2001 for the sample used in Table 3 (column I) was 0.48.   
  Moreover, the propensity for female heads with children to accumulate liquid assets was 
negatively related to the extent to which the state relaxed liquid asset limits (column I of Panel 
A).   The negative decline, however, was not significantly different from zero (point estimate = -
0.020; standard error = 0.025).  The point estimate and the standard error allow us to reject any 
sizable response on the part of female headed households with children to the change in liquid 
asset limits.   The 95 percent confidence band ranges from -0.07 to 0.03.   Remember from Table 
2 that approximately 85% of female headed households with children had liquid assets less than 
$1,000.  If the liquid asset limit was deterring liquid asset accumulation, we would expect that 
the majority of female heads with children to increase their liquid assets after the assets limits 
were loosened.    As in Table 2, panel A of Table 3 shows that female heads with children were 
not more likely to increase their savings in response to the relaxation of AFDC/TANF asset 
limits in the mid-1990s. 
  Panel B of Table 3 examines the change in actual liquid assets between 1994 and 2001.   
There is some evidence that male headed households and females without kids increased savings 
in response to the liquid asset limits.   This result, as discussed above, could be the result of a  
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spurious correlation between the propensity for an individual to accumulate assets and the extent 
to which their state increased its liquid asset limit.  As seen in Table 2, higher savers (as 
measured by 1994 characteristics) tend to reside in high asset limit changing states.  What is 
interesting with respect to Table 3, panel B is that female heads with children actually 
experienced a decline in liquid asset accumulation in response to the increase in their state's asset 
limit.  This response is not statistically different from zero (point estimate = -0.07; standard error 
= 0.10).  However, as above, the 95% confidence band rules out any sizable positive response to 
the asset limit changes for females with children (confidence band ranges from -0.27 to 0.13).    
The upper bound of the confidence band is well below the predicted increase in savings if 
households assuming a 3% savings rate (see expected savings response predicted above).   
Moreover, they are much smaller than the estimates reported in Powers (1998).   
  It is possible that the results in Table 3 mask the saving response to the liquid asset 
change because we include households who were likely not bound by the initial asset limits in 
1994.  Specifically, if the asset limit in 1994 was binding, households should have accumulated 
less than $1,000 in liquid assets.  Column I of Table 4 re-estimates equation (4) on a sample of 
households who had liquid assets in 1994 less than $1,000 (737 households). We run this 
regression without any truncation.  Like for the full sample in Appendix Table A2, we find that 
higher income, more educated, white households saved much more than other households.     
However, once we restrict the sample to households that should be bound by the asset limits, 
none of the welfare policies have any statistical or economic effect.  Specifically, the effect of 
increasing the asset limits on the liquid asset saving for female headed households with children 
had a 95% confidence interval of -0.03 to 0.02 (column I of Table 4).   Of all the results in the 
paper, this one proves most challenging for the theory that AFDC liquid asset limits are a  
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deterrent to household saving.  By focusing on households that should be bound by the asset 
limit (those with initial liquid asset less than $1,000) and focusing on those who are most likely 
to take up AFDC/TANF (female heads with children), we find no response at all to the change in 
liquid asset limits. 
  In columns II and III of Table 4, we increase the sample restriction for 1994 liquid assets 
from $1,000 to $2,500 (column II) and from $1,000 to $5,000 (column III).  We do so to account 
for the possibility that the near poor, i.e. those low-income families who maintain a low stock of 
wealth in the event that a negative income shock would force them onto welfare, may respond to 
the higher asset limits. The results are nearly identical to what was reported in Table 3 and 
column I of Table 4.  Female heads with children do not respond to the increase in liquid asset 
limits.   Reasonable saving rates predict that ϕ from equation (4) should be close to 1 if the liquid 
asset limits are binding.  Collectively, the results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that ϕ is close to 
zero.  Even though we have small sample sizes, we can statistically reject that ϕ is greater than 
0.05 for female heads with children (using the 95 percent confidence bands from Table 4).   In 
summary, our 95% confidence band estimates of the impact of relaxing liquid asset limits on the 
liquid asset accumulation of female heads with children range from -0.13 to 0.05, with the mean 
point estimate being -0.03 (Table 4 results).
18 
B.  Changes in Asset Ownership 
  One of the major rationales for relaxing welfare liquid asset limits was to promote self-
sufficiency among the population at risk for welfare take up.  In this section, we examine the 
extent to which female heads with children enter different asset markets in response to changes 
                                                      
18   Tables 3 and 4 were also estimated using state fixed effects.  The coefficients on the change in asset limits interacted with the 
dummy for female head with children did not change when state fixed effects were included.  In earlier versions of the paper, we 
directly explored the endogeneity of the state's welfare policy changes with respect to the savings behavior of citizens within its 
state.  We found no evidence that such endogeneity was important.  See Hurst and Ziliak (2001).  
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in state liquid asset limits.   Table 5 examines the transition into checking account ownership, 
vehicle ownership, home ownership, stock ownership or small business ownership between 1994 
and 2001.   The control variables are exactly the same as those used in Tables 3 and 4.  For the 
results in Table 5, we use the untrimmed sample (column II of Table 3).    The only additional 
restriction we make to the sample is that the households in the sample do not own the given asset 
in 1994.  That is, we want to ask if the relaxation of the welfare asset limits spurred entry into 
different asset categories.  For example, in column I of Table 5, we examine the transition into 
checking/saving account ownership for households who did not own a checking/savings account 
in 1994. Similar restrictions are imposed for columns II–V of Table 5. 
  Overall, as seen in column I to Table 5, female heads with children were more likely to 
start a checking or savings account than the comparison group of male headed households or 
female heads with no children (coefficient = 0.07; standard error = 0.06). However, the 
propensity to own a checking account is unrelated to the change in the state asset limit.  If 
anything, female heads with children may have been slightly less likely to start a checking 
account if they lived in a state which had large increases in welfare asset limits (coefficient = -
0.02 with a standard error of 0.02).  The 95 percent confidence bands imply that the propensity to 
become a checking or savings account owner changes by -0.06 to 0.02 percentage points for 
every $1,000 increase in the states welfare asset limit.  This effect is both economically and 
statistically equal to zero.   Similar results hold for entering home ownership (column III), 
becoming a stock owner (column IV), and starting a business (column V).  Female heads with 
children entered these markets with a lower probability than similar male or female headed 
households with no children.   More importantly, their propensity to enter these markets was 
unrelated to the relaxation of welfare asset limits.  
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  One notable exception was entering vehicle ownership (column II of Table 5).  Females 
with kids were 17 percentage points less likely to become a car owner than male headed 
households or female headed households with no children (standard error = 0.08).  However, this 
negative propensity diminished for females who lived in high asset limit changing states.   
Formally, every $1,000 increase in asset limits increased a female headed household with 
children’s propensity of owning a car by 13 percentage points (standard error = 0.05).   This 
implies that a female head with children who lived in a state where the asset limit remained 
constant (in real terms) was 17 percentage points less likely to buy a car between 1994 and 2001.  
A female head with children who lived in a state where the asset limit increased by $1,000 (in 
real terms) was 4 percentage points less likely than the comparison group to buy a car between 
1994 and 2001 (-0.17 + 0.13).   A female head with children who lived in a state where the asset 
limit increased by $2,000 (in real terms) was 9 percentage points more likely to buy a car during 
that same time period (-0.17 + 0.26).  Of all the results in the paper, we only find a positive effect 
of relaxing liquid limits on the propensity to purchase a car. In terms of increasing self 
sufficiency during the late 1990s for female heads with children, even this effect is small for 
those living in states with large liquid asset limit increases. 
C.  Net Worth and the Powers Sample 
  In this section, we examine the effects of relaxing liquid asset limits on net worth.   Given 
the results above, there is little reason to believe that net worth will change.  We have shown that 
changes in liquid asset limits did not affect changes in the level of liquid assets for female heads 
with children nor did they affect the propensity to start a business, open a checking account, 
purchase stocks, or buy a home for these households. In this sub-section, we re-estimate equation 
(4) by replacing the change in liquid assets between 1994 and 2001 with the change in net worth  
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between 1994 and 2001.  For consistency with Powers (1998), we restrict the sample to only 
female headed households with children.  This eliminates our use of the comparison groups of 
men and female heads without children. Powers, using NLSY data, had a sample of 221 
households.  Our sample, using the PSID, has 274 households.        
  The coefficient on the liquid asset limit change for this sample with the dependent 
variable being the change in net worth between 1994 and 2001 was -0.49 (standard error = 0.42).   
If we restrict the analysis to households with initial net worth in 1994 < $1,000 or initial net 
worth in 1994 < $5,000, our estimates were, respectively, 0.01 (standard error = 0.20) and -0.20 
(standard error = 0.27).     The standard errors on our estimates are quite large (as are those in 
Powers’ net wealth regressions).  However, in all our specifications the point estimate was zero 
or largely negative.  Moreover, if we run a simple regression where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the change in net worth was positive, we find that the 
coefficient on a $1,000 change in asset limits is 0.01 with a standard error of 0.03.  This implies 
that while the actual net worth change may be noisily estimated, the probability of increasing net 
worth increased by essentially zero in response to the relaxation of liquid asset limits.   
  That we are unsuccessful in replicating Powers’ point estimate of 0.25 may be due to a 
number of reasons.  First, Powers uses nominal dollars for her income and wealth calculations, 
which may lead to a spurious positive finding in her results as the 1979-1983 period was a time 
of high inflation (e.g. average annual nominal income grew at 11 percent per year for her sample, 
even though real incomes among female heads fell overall).  Second, her sample period spanned 
a severe recession whereas ours is a period of expansion, and she did not include controls for 
state business cycles as we do. Third, the quality of her NLSY net worth measure is likely 
inferior to the one we use in the PSID both because the NLSY does not have vehicle equity and  
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it does not have as broad a measure of outstanding debts as in the PSID.  Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, there is evidence that a state's choice of welfare asset limit is positively related 
to the saving behavior of households in those states (Table 2).  In our analysis, we take this 
correlation seriously by using comparison groups and by restricting our focus to only those 
households who could have been conceivably bound by the initial policies.   
VI.   Robustness 
A.  Examining Other Policy Reforms 
  The PRWORA legislation introduced a plethora of additional programmatic changes to 
cash welfare, some of which were expected to directly affect saving, others of which were 
expected to affect saving indirectly via changes in labor-market earnings.  Included in the latter 
group are work requirements for benefit receipt and benefit sanctions for failure to follow 
program rules.  To the extent that saving and earnings are positively correlated, these work 
policies are expected to raise saving insofar as they raise earnings. All of our empirical work 
above controls directly for levels and changes in household earnings.  For completeness we also 
experimented with including controls to capture state work requirements (not reported).  The 
inclusion of such variables neither directly affected household saving (once controlling for 
earnings), nor did their inclusion alter any of the parameter estimates discussed above.  
  Aside from relaxing liquid asset limits and implementing work requirements, PWRORA 
allowed states to alter other policies regarding their delivery of cash welfare.  In particular, many 
states altered their vehicle asset limits and imposed time limits on the receipt of welfare benefits.  
We briefly address each of these two policy changes, in turn.   
  First, prior to PRWORA, almost all states had a binding vehicle asset limit of $1500.  
Currently, 22 states allow unlimited vehicle equity on at least one automobile.  For those that  
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restrict the amount of vehicle equity, the vehicle equity limits have been significantly expanded.   
Appendix Table A1 summarizes the changes in vehicle equity limits across states.  If the vehicle 
limit was initially binding, we would predict that relaxing the vehicle limit would stimulate 
either car ownership directly or it would stimulate liquid asset accumulation (giving a greater 
incentive to save for a car down payment).  We will test for this directly by augmenting equation 
(4) with two additional variables:  1) a dummy variable indicating whether the state has a binding 
vehicle equity limit and 2) the change in the vehicle asset limit if the state does not allow 
unlimited vehicle equity.   We predict the coefficient on the first variable would be negative and 
the coefficient on the second variable would be positive.  In other words, the higher the new 
limit, the bigger the increase in savings. 
  Additionally, we control directly for whether the state has imposed welfare time limits.  
Under AFDC recipients remained eligible for benefits so long as they met program eligibility 
rules. However, PRWORA fundamentally changed the provision of benefits by imposing a 
lifetime limit on benefit receipt.  This provision was a culmination of waivers from federal rules 
that were implemented in several states in the mid 1990s.  Because the limit may be lowered at 
state discretion, nineteen states have opted to lower the time limits below the sixty-month federal 
maximum.  Four states (California, Maryland, New York, and Rhode Island) have opted to 
provide a reduced benefit to the family or children after the sixty-month time limit is reached, 
while Michigan has opted out of terminal time limits altogether and will provide the full benefit 
out of state funds after the federal limit is reached.  States are permitted to exempt up to twenty 
percent of their caseload from the time limits for any reason. Appendix Table A3 provides a 
summary of state time limits.    To capture the effects of time limits, we include a variable that  
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measures (in months) the maximum amount of time a household can receive TANF benefits.    
All else equal, at risk households living in states with a shorter time limit should save more. 
19, 
20 
  In Table 6 we show the results of three specifications on the trimmed sample from Table 
3: a linear probability model of whether liquid assets increased between 1994 and 2001; a robust 
regression model of the dollar change in liquid assets; and a linear probability model of whether 
vehicle equity increased between 1994 and 2001.  In the first model there is some weak evidence 
(p-value = 0.19) that controlling for other policies the saving of female heads with children was 
about 3 percentage points higher per $1000 increase in the asset limit relative to the comparison 
group, but the total effect of 6 percent is small.  However, except for the indicator on whether the 
state has a vehicle limit, none of the other policies are economically or statistically significant in 
any of the three specifications.  In the case of the vehicle limit the results in column 1 of Table 6 
indicate that female heads with kids are 34 percent less likely to have a positive change in their 
liquid asset position relative to the comparison group, but for those residing in states with vehicle 
limits that probability is lowered by 22 percent.  The latter is contrary to expectations, but it 
disappears once we control for state fixed effects (not tabulated). 
B.  Program Interactions and Excess Zeros 
  Nearly 90 percent of AFDC/TANF recipients also receive assistance from the Food 
Stamp Program.  In the years leading up to welfare reform, the nominal food-stamp liquid asset 
limit of $2000 (for non-elderly families) was double the nominal AFDC asset limit. However, 
after welfare reform in the mid 1990s, many states increased their asset limit above the food 
                                                      
19 We also control for the level and change in welfare benefits between 1994 and 2001, as summarized in Appendix Table A4. 
20 In an earlier version of this paper we included an indicator variable for the presence of an Individual Development Account 
(IDA) program.  Such a program offers state matching funds for targeted saving by low income households.  The saving is 
earmarked for specific goals like human capital accumulation or the down payment for a home.  The coefficient on the IDA 
dummy was economically small and statistically zero.  Because of the limited availability of the IDA program relative to other 
statewide reforms like asset limits and time limits we drop IDAs from the current paper and leave the evaluation of this 
potentially important program to future research.  None of the results presented in this paper are sensitive to the inclusion of IDA 
controls. 
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stamp limit, which remained fixed at $2000 (in nominal terms).  In the wake of welfare reform, 
the interaction effect between the resource limits in TANF and food stamps is complicated.  
TANF recipients continue to remain categorically eligible for food stamps even in states with 
asset limits above the federally set food stamp limit.  For such households, it is the TANF asset 
limits that are binding.  However, families strictly on food stamps in the higher TANF-limit 
states are held to the food stamp resource rules.  Likewise, those families who enter TANF after 
first participating on food stamps are likely to view the food stamp limit as the relevant binding 
constraint. 
  To permit the possibility of program interactions we redefine our asset limit variable in a 
given year to equal the minimum of the AFDC/TANF or food stamp asset limit.  This implies 
that identification of the asset limit change is based primarily on those states that increase their 
limit above the food stamp limit.  In previous versions of this paper, we explore this interaction 
more fully (see Hurst and Ziliak 2001).  In summary, the results are unchanged when allowing 
for policy interactions. There is no evidence that female heads with children responded to 
changes the welfare asset limits.  
  To this point we have treated households with no assets as indistinguishable from those 
with positive or negative values. It is conceivable that these families are different, and that the 
differences are not randomly distributed; that is, some households may face a ‘hurdle’ to enter 
financial markets. For example, some families may face borrowing constraints that inhibit their 
ability to assume debt (note in Table 2 that only 30 percent of female heads with children have 
debt compared to 50 percent among the comparison groups), others may have extremely high 
time discount rates, while still others may have time inconsistent preferences (Laibson 1997). If 
there are unobservable factors that are common to the decision of whether to save (dissave) and  
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the amount saved (dissaved) then least squares estimates will not be consistent. Additionally, 
while it is possible that there is no behavioral distinction between those with zero saving and 
those with positive or negative levels of saving, the fact that nearly half of our high-risk sample 
are at zero implies that there are important nonlinearities in the data that linear least squares will 
insufficiently capture.  In Hurst and Ziliak (2001) we consider several variants of a two-step 
hurdle model where in the first step we estimate the probability of non-zero saving and in the 
second step we estimate the effect of asset limit changes on saving conditional on a sample 
selection rule.  Again, our central conclusion that the saving of families at greatest risk of welfare 
use does not respond to changes in welfare asset limits remains unchanged. 
V. Conclusion 
  Are the ‘poor’ on the road to self-sufficiency after welfare reform?  The evidence 
presented here suggests that to date little progress is being made with respect to improved 
financial balance sheets. In general, the new saving incentives available to current and 
prospective welfare recipients have had at best a negligible economic impact on saving, with the 
possible exception of fostering the acquisition of a vehicle.  Perhaps it is still premature to make 
definitive claims on saving given the infancy of all the new programs.  But, as noted throughout 
the paper, even with modest saving rates, the relaxation of welfare limits should have increased 
savings by a sizeable amount between 1996 and 2001.  At the same token, nearly 85 percent of 
high welfare-risk households (i.e., female household heads with children) held liquid wealth 
below one half of the pre- welfare-reform limit.  This suggests that the limits are rarely binding 
for most households and thus, it is not too surprising that saving only responds minimally to the 
majority of the large changes in saving incentives offered through the welfare system.     
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  The model in Hubbard, et al. (1995) clearly recognized that not only may asset limits 
deter saving but also the fact that income transfers provide a consumption floor and thus reduce 
the need for precautionary saving.  Indeed, Ziliak (2003) showed both that means-tested transfers 
(i.e. AFDC/TANF, food stamps, and SSI) reduce liquid asset accumulation among the poor and 
that the poor show few signs of precautionary saving.  In contradistinction, these programs did 
not affect asset accumulation among the near poor and non poor, yet the latter groups 
demonstrated precautionary saving behavior.  Likewise, Neumark and Powers (1998) showed 
that the consumption floor provided by SSI reduces saving among the poor near retirement, 
while Engen and Gruber (2001) find that the floor provided by Unemployment Insurance reduces 
saving.  While the latter three studies did not separately identify the impact of asset limits from 
the consumption floor (note that there are no asset limits imposed on UI receipt), their results, 
coupled with the lack of asset-limit effects found in this study, point to the conclusion that if 
welfare programs do affect household savings it may be via access to the consumption floor and 
not asset limits per se.  
  What is self evident from this study is that any theory put forth to explain the asset 
accumulation of low-income households needs to reconcile the large percentage of households 
who persistently hold zero liquid assets.  However, these theories need not rely on non-
optimizing households. Variants of the life cycle model where households have high 
intertemporal discount rates or have time inconsistent preferences have been shown through 
calibration and simulation to match the large fraction of households with zero liquid assets in the 
data (see Angeletos et al., 2001). Regardless, the road to self-sufficiency for the poor is long 
indeed.  
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample and Separately by  





Male Heads and  
Female Heads 




      
Age  33.7 33.9 31.6 
% with Education < 12  0.15  0.11  0.28 
% with Education = 12  0.54  0.56  0.37 
% with Education > 12  0.33  0.33  0.36 
% where Household Head is Black  0.20  0.14  0.60 
% that have children under 17  0.62  0.57  1.0 
Number of children under 17  1.2  1.1  2.0 
% on AFDC  0.06  0.02  0.39 
% Ever on AFDC, 1994-2001 
 
 0.07   0.02   0.48 
Mean Household Total Income  41,100  44,800  14,600 
Median Household Total Income  33,300  39,200  10,400 
     
Mean Liquid Assets  12,800  14,300  2,100 
Median Liquid Assets  700  1,500  0 
Mean Net Worth  67,200  74,200  16,900 
Median Net Worth  16,400  25,400  400 
     
Mean Change in Liquid Assets  (94-01)  4,400 4,800 1,900 
Median Change in Liquid Assets (94-01)  0  0  0 
Mean Change in Net Worth (94-01) 








% in states with high asset limit changes  0.35  0.36  0.34 
     
Number of observations  1,418  1,137  281 
       
Notes:  Data are from the 1994 – 2001 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  All variables are for survey year 1994 unless otherwise 
indicated.  Change in asset holdings are measured between 1994 and 2001.   All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars.  Sample is 
restricted to all stable households where the head and marital status of the head remained constant between 1994 and 2001 and 
whose head was aged between 18 and 44 years.  Sample is further restricted to households who did not change their state of 
residence between 1994 and 2001.  Lastly, the sample is restricted to include only households with education less than 16 years 
of schooling.  All statistics in this table are weighted using 1997 core PSID weights.  Liquid assets are measured as including 
cash, checking account balances, savings account balances, and stock and bond holdings.  See text for full details.   Our female 
headed household with children sample imposes that the female head consistently had a child under the age of 17 in her 
households for all years between 1994 and 2001.  Likewise, female heads without children were required to not have had a child 
under 17 in her household at any time between 1994 and 2001.   
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Table 2:   Comparison of Asset Changes by Households Who Lived in States with Low and High Asset Limit Changes  
 
Panel A:  Female Headed Households with Children Sample (281 observations) 
  States with Low Asset Limit Changes  States with High Asset Limit Changes    
 1994  2001  Diff  p-value    1994  2001  Diff  p-value    Diff-Diff  p-value 
                     
Liquid Assets (median)  0  0  0  1.00    0  0  0  1.00    0  1.00 
Net Worth (median)  0  900  900  <0.01    1,900  2,000  100  0.89    -800  0.08 
                      
% with Liquid Assets > $1,000   0.13  0.19  0.06  0.14    0.18  0.26  0.08  0.07    0.02  0.77 
% with Liquid Assets > $500  0.15  0.23  0.08  0.07    0.23  0.31  0.08  0.17    0.00  0.90 
% with Liquid Assets > $0  0.26  0.41  0.15  <0.01    0.35  0.45  0.10  0.13    -0.05  0.41 
                      
% Owning a Car  0.42  0.60  0.18  <0.01    0.56  0.67  0.11  0.10    -0.07  0.33 
% Owning a Home  0.16  0.26  0.10  0.03    0.28  0.32  0.04  0.56    -0.06  0.27 
                      
 
Panel B:  Male Heads and Female Heads without Children Sample (1,137 observations) 
  States with Low Asset Limit Changes  States with High Asset Limit Changes    
 1994  2001  Diff  p-value    1994  2001  Diff  p-value    Diff-Diff  p-value 
                  
Liquid Assets (median)  1,600  1,800  200 0.72    1,300  1,800  500  0.14    300 0.57 
Net Worth (median)  22,900  38,800  15,900  <0.01    27,100  44,000  16,900  <0.01    1,000  0.92 
                      
% with Liquid Assets > $1,000   0.57  0.57  0.00  0.87    0.55  0.57  0.02  0.54    0.02  0.42 
% with Liquid Assets > $500  0.66  0.64  -0.02  0.54    0.62  0.63  0.01  0.73    0.03  0.37 
% with Liquid Assets > $0  0.74  0.78  0.04  0.06    0.73  0.76  0.03  0.22    -0.01  0.81 
                      
% Owning a Car  0.86  0.88  0.02  0.26    0.90  0.91  0.01  0.65    -0.01  0.61 
% Owning a Home  0.57  0.68  0.11  <0.01    0.67  0.74  0.07  0.01    -0.04  0.15 
                      
Notes:  Table shows the economic status of PSID respondents in 1994 and 2001.  The base sample is the same as described in the notes to Table 1.  Panel A focuses on female 
heads with children while Panel B focuses on the combined sample of male headed households and female heads without children.  The sample is divided into households who live 
in states with low asset limit changes between 1994 and 2001 ($1,000 and less) and households who live in states with high asset limit changes between 1994 and 2001 (greater 
than $1,000).  Appendix Table 1 lists the states with small and large asset limit changes.  The column labeled "Diff" reports the difference in economic status between 1994 and 
2001 within each state asset limit change grouping.  The "Diff-Diff" column reports the difference in the 1994-2001 change across the states with low asset limit change and the 
states with the high asset limit changes.    
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Table 3: Response of Liquid Assets Accumulation to Relaxation of State Asset Limits 
 
Panel A:  Dependent Variables is a Dummy Variable = 1 if Change in Liquid Assets  







    
Change in State Asset Limit x 1000  0.025  0.025 
 (0.008)  (0.011) 
    




    
Female with Kids Dummy  0.020  -0.026 
 (0.040)  (0.035) 
    
Truncated Change in Liquid Asset  Sample  Yes  No 
    
    








    
Change in State Asset Limit  0.082  0.037 
 (0.044)  (0.054) 
    
Female with Kids * Change in State Asset Limit  -0.073  0.009 
 (0.100)  (0.129) 
    
Female with Kids Dummy  125  134 
 (137)  (172) 
    
Truncated Change in Liquid Asset  Sample  Yes  No 
    
    
Notes:  Data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  See footnote to Table 1 for full sample description.  Column I 
imposes the additional restriction that households in the top and bottom 5% of the change in liquid assets distribution (between 
1994 and 2001) are truncated (1,238 households).  Column II reports the results from the original (un-truncated) sample (1,418 
households).    All regressions include demographic, income and state economic controls.  See Appendix A2 for the full results to 
the regressions reported.  The standard errors for Panel A are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-state autocorrelation, while 
those in Panel B are bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 4:  Response of Liquid Assets Accumulation to Relaxation of State Asset Limits, Restricting 
Sample to Those Potentially Bound By Initial Asset Limit 
 












     
Change in State Asset Limit  0.010  0.048  0.079 
  (0.004) (0.020) (0.026) 
     
Female with Kids * Change in State Asset Limit  -0.005  -0.061  -0.080 
  (0.008) (0.038) (0.054) 
     
Female with Kids Dummy  7  95  138 
  (11) (52) (74) 
     
Truncated Change in Liquid Asset  Sample  No  No  No 
     
Sample Size  737  912  1,027 
     
     
Notes:  Data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  See footnote to Table 1 for full sample description.  Base sample is 
the same as the untrimmed sample from Table 3 with the following additional restrictions:  Column I imposes that households 
have initial assets less than $1,000 in 1994, Column II imposes that households have initial assets less than $2,500 in 1994, and 
Column III imposes that households have initial assets less than $5,000 in 1994.  Dependent variable is the change in liquid 
assets between 1994 and 2001. All regressions include the same demographic, income and state economic controls as included in 
the regressions reported in Table 3. Bootstrapped standard errors from the robust regressions are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 5:   Change in Asset Ownership between 1994 and 2001 as a Function of State Asset Limit Changes 
 
















       
Change in State Asset Limit *1,000  0.026  -0.058  0.020  -0.018  0.014 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) 
       
Female with Kids * Change in State Asset Limit * 1,000  -0.017  0.128  -0.014  0.010  -0.005 
  (0.023) (0.051) (0.031) (0.012) (0.013) 
       
Female with Kids Dummy  0.071  -0.168  -0.049  -0.020  -0.049 
  (0.055) (0.081) (0.043) (0.022)  (0.0019) 
       
Mean  of  Dependent  Variable  0.410 0.505 0.299 0.074 0.067 
       
Sample  Size  525 288 667  1,143  1,297 
       
       
Notes:  Data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  See footnote to Table 1 for full sample description.  Base sample is the same as the untrimmed sample from Table 3 .  
However, column I restricts to households who did not own a checking or savings account in 1994, column II restricts the sample to households who did not own a vehicle in 1994, 
column III restricts the sample to households no owning a home in 1994, column IV restricts the sample to households not owning stocks in 1994, and column V restricts the 
sample to households not owning a business in 1994.  Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the households owned the portfolio component in 2001.  All 
regressions include the same demographic, income and state economic controls as included in the regressions reported in Table 3. The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and within-state autocorrelation. 
 
 
    
   
       
   
  







































Notes:  Data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  See footnote to Table 1 for full sample description.  The sample is the 
same as the trimmed sample from Table 3.  Dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the households had 
a positive change in liquid assets between 1994 and 2001; in column 2 it is the dollar change in liquid assets; in column 3 it is a 
dummy variable if the family owned a vehicle in 2001change in vehicle equity was positive.  All regressions include the same 
demographic, income and state economic controls as included in the regressions reported in Table 3. The standard errors in 















in Liquid Assets  
(1994-2001) 
 
Change in  







      
Policy Variables      
      
  Change in Asset Limit  3.95 E-5  0.06  4.33 E-6 
  (1.22 E-5)  (0.05)  (1.76 E-5) 
  Have a Vehicle Limit  0.05  -66  0.03 
 (0.04)  (141)  (0.04) 
  Change in Vehicle Limit  -5.94 E-6  -0.01  -1.28 E-5 
  (7.80 E-6)  (0.03)  (1.11 E-5) 
  Have a Time Limit  -0.007  -148  -0.002 
 (0.03)  (92)  (0.04) 
      
Policy Variable * Females w/Children      
      
  Change in Asset Limit  3.27 E-5  -0.05  4.84 E-5 
  (2.47 E-5)  (0.12)  (4.21 E-5) 
  Have a Vehicle Limit  0.22  57  0.12 
 (0.07)  (301)  (0.11) 
  Change in Vehicle Limit  -1.73 E-5  0.04  -0.03 
 (1.75  E-5)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
  Have a Time Limit  0.01  59  -2.48 E-6 
 (0.06)  (206)  (1.86  E-5) 
      
Dummy:  Female Head with Children  -0.34  -433  0.40 
 (0.32)  (1043)  (0.52) 
      
Sample Size  1,238  1,238  1,238 
      
       




Appendix Table A1:  Changes in State Asset and Vehicle Equity Limits as of Fiscal Year 2001 
 
State  Change in Asset Limit  Amount of Change ($)  Change in Vehicle 
Limit 

































































































































































































































































Notes:  Data come from Gallagher, et al. (1998); TANF Report to Congress (August 1998; May 2002). All dollar amounts are in 
current dollars.
    
a By the end of the 1998 fiscal year Ohio became the only state without a liquid asset limit.  
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Notes:  Data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  See footnote to Table 3 for full sample description.   Dependent 
variable in Panel A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household had positive liquid saving between 1994 and 2001, and in 
Panel B is the change in liquid assets between 1994 and 2001.  All level variables are measures as of 1994.  All change variables 
are measured as the change between 1994 and 2001. 
Appendix Table A2:  Full Specification for the Regression Results Reported in Table 3  
 
Variable 








        








































































Average Household Labor Income (1994 – 2001)  7.61e - 6 







Average Household Labor Income Squared  -4.19e -11 
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Appendix Table A3.  State Termination Time Limits as of Fiscal Year 2001 
 

























































































































24 out of 60 
 
 
















24 out of 84 
 
 










Source: Gallagher, et al. (1998); TANF Report to Congress (August 1998; May 2002) 
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Appendix Table A4:  Maximum State AFDC/TANF Benefits for a Family of Three 
 


























































































































































Source: 1994 Green Book and Congressional Research Service Report 98–480. 
All dollar amounts are in current dollars. 
 
 